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Human Ecology Forum

From “Winners and Losers” to New Authority
Structures in Ecological Policy

’

Errol E. Meidinger
State University of New York
Buffalo, New York 14260

Introduction
The papers prepared for this Colloquium on “Emerging
Ecological Policy: Winners and Losers” devote strikingly little
discussion to who actually wins or loses as a result of new policies. While this may he good, it bean some critical reflection,
especially since environmental policy has more than once been
caught up short on the problem of distributive justicc (c.g.,
Schnaiherg, et al. 1986; Bullard 1990). No doubt part of the
explanation is the sheer difficulty of accurately measuring
costs and benefits and connecting them to specific individuals
and groups. However, the larger reason may be that ecological
policy has moved from being marginalized as either an economic or an aesthetic issue, to being a central arena for the
ongoing construction of governance institutions. Thus, the
Colloquium papers do attend to winners and losers, but largely
in terms of their institutionalized ability to shape environmental decisions, rather than the direct benefits or losses they may
experience.
This comment focuses on key points ahout the distribution
of authority in ecological policy. First, the existing distribution
is considerably more dispersed than most of the Colloquium
authors tend to assume. Second, current natural resource policy scholarship suffers from two key shortcomings: an inahility to analyze the cumulative effects of systems of rules and a
serious lack of attention to the policy roles of non-governmental, nonmarket international organizations.

Ecological Authority
Although it is common and intellectually convenient to
conceptualize authority over any given action as held hy an
individual actor, law and other social control mechanisms typically share authority out among plural agents (Walker 1995;
Meidinger 1996). Thus, both public and private landowners
may have formal authority to decide how many animals to
graze on their land, or how many trees to harvest-but they
must also take due account of effects on neighbors, mineral
owners, future owners, water quality, taxes, endangered
species, creditors, shareholders, employees, customers, and a
host of other interests. Traditionally, law has been used to
institutionalize those interests in the form of rules and procedures. The best justification for using law in this way is that it
can protect the interests of many actors while eliminating the
need to negotiate with them over every individual decision.
Rules have a way of accumulating over time, however, and
recent years have seen growing complaints that their combined
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effect is to overburden action, stifle creativity, foster inefficiency, etc. While these complaints have a cyclical history, and
hark hack to a mythic Anglo-Saxon freedom that probably
never existed (e.g., Meidinger 1993), they may also indicate
that we have crossed a threshold of legal complexity and need
to develop less complex and burdensome institutional guidance
systems.

Institutional Change
Although the judicial retrenchment documented hy Keiter
(1996) promises to be an important institutional adjustment,
the Colloquium papers advocate several others. One of the
most common, discussed by Hess (1996) and Randall (1996),
is simply to lop off certain rule-defined claims and convert the
remaining ones into marketable property rights held by particular actors. This approach limits deposed claimants to biddmg
for resources in the market, and is thus critically dependent on
defming property rights that adequately protect essential social
values for which there will he no bidders.
A second approach, advocated hy all the Colloquium
papers, is to hold a new round of negotiations among relevant
interests in hopes of working out a new set of policy parameters. As in the property rights strategy, important substantive
policy decisions are often made in deciding which interests to
include in the negotiations. Lee (1996), for example, advocates the superiority of local or “community” organizations for
ecological management, whereas Merchant (1996) advocates
inclusion of a more expansive, open-ended set of interests.
Although negotiating groups can he convened by either private
or governmental actors, governments are often important in
ratifying and enforcing outcomes. Governments increasingly
institute negotiation processes when problems are especially
complex or their capacity to handle them is uncertain (e.g.,
Perritt 1986).
A thiid approach is simply to develop new rules (such as
the “outcome-based” form advocated by Hess 1996) to adjust
or displace old ones. In principle, this could be pursued at any
or all of three levels: local, national, and international. In practice, the local watershed management efforts discussed in the
other Colloquium papers have led to some changes in rules and
are likely to lead to more. They are inevitably constrained,
however, hy the fact that many of the key U.S. rules were made
hy the national government, and are difficult to affect from the
local level.
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At the national level, there has been relatively little effort
to achieve comprehensive revisions in rules. Private organizations have occasionally suggested the general outlines of general statutory revisions, but have not put significant resources
into producing comprehensive new rule systems. The federal
government recently concluded a comprehensive review of
existing laws, but, for reasons discussed below, did not propose
any comprehensive legal change (Interagency Ecosystem
Management Task Force 1995).
Some of the most sweeping efforts to create new rules and
institutions for natural resources are occurring not only at the
international level, but in the private and quasi-private sphere.
The most prominent, the Forest Stewardship Council and the
International Standards Organization are described in a separate article (Meidmger 1997). The remainder of the present
paper addresses the current research gaps in the areas of the
cumulative effects of rule systems and of private international
natural resource policy making institutions.

Research Needs
Comprehensive Federal Environmental Law Reform.
Despite countless calls for integrating, streamlining, or harmonizing federal environmental laws (e.g., Guruswamy 1992),
there have been strikingly few efforts to actually do so. The
recent report by the Interagency Task Force on Ecosystem
Management (1995) concluded that existing federal laws do
not seriously inhibit the development of cross-jurisdictional,
coordinated ecosystem management and that no significant
legal reform is called for. While this report was prepared
entirely by federal officials and could be seen as reflecting a
fear of undermining core structures of government, it more
likely reflects the enormous intellectual difficulty of dealing
with cumulative effects of rules. Considered individually, as is
the custom in legal scholarship, most existing rules make sense
and can be dealt with. Because legal scholars have not developed widely accepted methods for analyzing whole systems of
rules, however, we and our students find it difficult to develop
shared diagnoses of systems. A key need in future scholarship,
therefore, is to develop a stronger capacity to analyze the
cumulative effects of rules.
Scholarly Inattention to Private International Policy-making. A more puzzling shortcoming, given this decade’s focus
on domestic private policy-makiing systems such as marketable
property rights and alternative dispute resolution processes,
has been the striking inattention to non-governmental policymaking processes at the international level. This research
deficit is likely to reduce both the contributions scholars can
make to those processes and our ability to analyze them critically. Although there are probably many reasons for this
neglect, several can be noted here. First, private international
natural resource organizations rarely hire policy scholars, and
when they do, it is generally to address a fairly narrow question rather than to perform comprehensive reflective work.
Conversely, those organizations generally have sufficient
resources not to depend on scholars for the kind of gratis work
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that often leads to on-the-side policy research in local domains.
Second, the conventional assumption of the policy disciplines
that governments make policy and markets do not continues to
hold broad sway in the natural resources field. The policy-making roles of business f m s and associations come into cognizance primarily in their efforts to influence governments, and
those of a third category of non-governmentalhonmarket institutions have hardly been noticed. Like our failure to study the
cumulative effects of legal rules, this is a critical shortcoming.
The role of these “third stream” institutions is an area in urgent
need of research.

Endnote
I . Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Sociology,
State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260
(eemeid@acsu.buffalo.edu).
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